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HORIZONTAL POLICIES IN PUBLIC PROCUREMENT:  
A TAXONOMY1 
Sue Arrowsmith* 
 
ABSTRACT. Public procurement is widely used to promote objectives of an 
economic, environmental and social nature, such as the economic 
development of disadvantaged social groups. This article elaborates a 
detailed taxonomy of such “horizontal” policies. This study is valuable, first, 
to facilitate analysis of the practical phenomenon of horizontal policies and 
of the policy implications of different approaches and, second, to illuminate 
and develop the relevant regulatory frameworks under national and 
international regimes. The taxonomy is based on three key distinctions 
between the following: 1. policies limited to securing compliance with legal 
requirements and those that go beyond such requirements; 2. policies 
applied only to the contract awarded and those that go beyond it; and 3. 
nine different mechanisms by which policies are implemented in the 
procurement process. 
INTRODUCTION 
The use of public procurement as a policy tool is a longstanding 
and much-analysed phenomenon, which covers a range of policy 
areas such as support for fair labour conditions, regional 
development and the provision of economic opportunities for 
disadvantaged groups (see the review and literature in Arrowsmith, 
Linarelli  & Wallace, 2000; McCrudden, 2007). Such policies have      
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sometimes been referred to as “secondary” policies, in contrast with 
the so-called “primary” objective of a procurement of obtaining goods, 
works or services on the best terms (e.g. Arrowsmith, 1996; 2005; 
Priess & Pitschas, 2000), as “collateral” policies (Cibinic & Nash, 
1998) or as socio-economic policies. However, the term “horizontal” 
policies is preferable. This term is sufficiently generic to embrace all 
types of policies (economic, social, political, environmental,  etc.) but, 
in contrast with the terminology of “secondary” or “collateral” policies 
does not imply that such policies are necessarily illegitimate or 
subservient to commercial aspects (Arrowsmith & Kunzlik, 2009). 
This article elaborates a detailed taxonomy of horizontal policies 
which is independent of the subject-matter of these policies. This is 
valuable for two main reasons.  
First, a detailed taxonomy is useful for fully understanding the 
practical phenomenon of horizontal policies and the constitutional 
and policy implications of different approaches. Whilst it is not the 
aim of this short article on taxonomy to offer an exhaustive analysis of 
the policy issues, the article will briefly review the main issues 
affecting the value, legitimacy, transparency and effectiveness of 
policies. This highlights the diverse concerns that arise with different 
approaches and, hence, the value of a carefully nuanced taxonomy.  
Second, the taxonomy provides a framework for understanding 
and developing regulatory provisions on horizontal policies.  
Horizontal policies are extensively regulated both under national 
procurement rules and – increasingly - under international trade 
regimes such as those of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and 
European Union (EU), which aim to limit policies with a 
disproportionate impact on trade (e.g. Arrowsmith & Kunzlik, 2009; 
McCrudden, 2007; Arrowsmith, 2003, Chapter 13). A detailed 
taxonomy can help us to understand the precise remit of the relevant 
legislation/treaties and court decisions, and can also facilitate sound 
future development by illuminating relevant distinctions and options. 
Again, this article focused on taxonomy is not intended to provide an 
exhaustive analysis of regulatory issues. However, the article will give 
examples of how different approaches are treated in a regulatory 
context, in order to illustrate the practical relevance of the 
distinctions in the taxonomy. 
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The taxonomy elaborates the author’s previous analysis 
(Arrowsmith, 2005; Arrowsmith, Linarelli & Wallace, 2000), which has 
already been used for the purposes referred to above by other 
scholars (for example, Watermeyer [2004]; Ssennoga [2006]). 
Concrete examples of policies are taken mainly from jurisdictions 
studied by the author, notably the WTO, EU, United Kingdom, United 
States, and South Africa. However, the approaches and mechanisms 
that they illustrate are found in many other jurisdictions.  
FOUNDATIONS: THREE KEY DISTINCTIONS 
The proposed taxonomy is based on three key distinctions. The 
first is a distinction between, on the one hand, policies that are 
limited to securing compliance with general legal requirements – for 
example, a requirement for government contractors to pay their 
workers the minimum wage applicable by law to all firms in the 
jurisdiction – and, on the other hand, policies that go beyond this – 
for example, a requirement to pay “fair” wages that exceed the 
national legal minimum.  
A second distinction is one between policies concerned only with 
performance of the contract – such as a requirement to pay “fair” 
wages to employees engaged in government work – and policies that 
are more general, such as a requirement for government contractors 
to pay “fair” wages to all their employees.  
Thirdly, the taxonomy distinguishes between nine different 
mechanisms for implementing horizontal policies, such as set-asides 
(whereby contracts are reserved solely for certain groups and award 
criteria (giving credit to tenderers for the environmental or social 
benefits of their tenders)). These mechanisms involve different 
advantages/disadvantages, including in balancing horizontal policies 
with other objectives, such as value for money and efficiency, and are 
also differently treated by trade regimes because of the differing 
extent to which they impact on trade (Arrowsmith, 2009).  
These three distinctions, and the interrelationship between them, 
will now be examined in turn. The distinctions and certain further sub-
divisions within them discussed below are summarised in Table 1. 
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TABLE 1 
Summary of the Taxonomy 
Key Distinction 1: Whether Limited to Legal Compliance 
1. Policies limited to compliance with general legal requirements 
2. Policies that go beyond compliance with general legal 
requirements 
Key Distinction 2:  Whether Confined to Performance of the Contract 
Awarded 
1.Policies confined to contract performance 
i. Decisions to purchase or not to purchase 
ii. Decisions on what to purchase 
iii. Mechanisms for implementing policies in the award 
procedure (contract conditions, award criteria etc) 
1. Consumption measures 
2. Production/delivery measures 
3. Disposal measures 
4. Workforce measures 
2.Policies that go beyond contract performance 
Key Distinction 3:  Mechanisms for Implementing Policies 
1. The decision to purchase or not to purchase 
2. The decision on what to purchase 
3. Contract conditions laid down by the purchaser 
4. Packaging and timing of orders 
5. Set-asides 
6. Exclusion from contracts for non-compliance with government 
policies 
7. Preferences in inviting firms to tender 
8. Award criteria 
9. Measures for improving access to government contracts 
 
 
POLICIES LIMITED TO COMPLIANCE WITH GENERAL LEGAL REQUIREMENTS 
AND THOSE THAT GO BEYOND LEGAL COMPLIANCE 
Policies Limited to Compliance with General Legal Requirements 
Some Examples 
As mentioned, a first distinction is between policies limited to a 
contractor’s compliance with legal general norms and policies that go 
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beyond this.  An example of the first type of policy is a contractual 
undertaking when, in carrying out the contract work; a contractor will 
comply with general legislation on health and safety at work. Another 
is a policy followed in many jurisdictions of excluding from 
government contracts any firms with convictions for certain criminal 
offences. This can be considered a horizontal policy to the extent that 
it is directed at deterring and punishing criminal behaviour rather 
than merely at ensuring reliability to perform the contract: this is the 
case, for example, with the mandatory exclusions for corruption and 
certain other offences under the EU procurement directives (Williams, 
2009). Another interesting example is Northern Ireland’s government 
policy under the Fair and Equal Treatment Order 1998 (FETO) 
(McCrudden, 2007, pp. 305-310). Against a historical background of 
religious and political divisions between the Roman Catholic and 
Protestant communities of Northern Ireland, this instrument prohibits 
discrimination on political and religious grounds and also requires 
both public and private sector organisations to secure fair 
employment opportunities regardless of religious or political belief 
through a requirement to monitor and review their employment 
practices and, in certain cases, to take remedial steps. This regime 
employs disqualification from public contracts as one sanction for 
non-compliance with the general policy. 
Relationship with the Second and Third Distinctions 
In terms of the second distinction between policies relating to the 
contract (as is discussed further below) and policies that go beyond 
the contract, policies limited to enforcing general legal norms can fall 
within either category. Thus a contractual obligation to follow health 
and safety legislation when working on the contract, for example, is 
clearly limited to the contract. On the other hand, a mandatory 
exclusion of all contractors convicted of corruption potentially affects 
any business activity of contractors. So also does Northern Ireland 
government’s policy under FETO. 
With regard to the nine policy mechanisms elaborated later 
below, on the other hand, whilst many are potentially applicable for 
ensuring compliance with general legal norms, not all are suitable for 
this purpose. This is particularly the case with contract award criteria. 
It is unlikely, for example, that a government will give extra points in 
tender evaluation to firms that have no convictions for corruption, 
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whilst admitting – albeit under a penalty in tender evaluation – firms 
that do. Rather, it is likely to prefer an approach that involves a 
contractual requirement for compliance with the law, or exclusion for 
past non-compliance.  
Reasons for Using Procurement to Support General Legal Norms 
Why do governments adopt procurement policies directed merely 
at compliance with pre-existing legal norms? We can identify several 
reasons.  
A first reason for adopting such policies is simply to avoid 
associating the government with unlawful behaviour, both to set an 
example and to avoid public criticism. A second set of reasons for 
policies that support legal compliance is to provide an additional 
enforcement tool for securing compliance with the general law and/or 
punish violations, and for reducing the risk of violations of the general 
law during contract performance. The possibility of terminating the 
contract, for instance, may induce compliance with the law during the 
contract work more effectively than a remote threat of criminal 
prosecution. Contractual sanctions may be especially useful if work 
will be carried out in another jurisdiction (for example, in the case of 
goods manufactured abroad) and the government awarding the 
contract has concerns over inadequate enforcement of the law in that 
jurisdiction (for example, on labour standards in factories). Measures 
to ensure legal compliance for both these reasons are often taken in 
relation to matters within the procuring entity’s own area of activity. 
For example, a Ministry for the Environment may be particularly 
concerned not to deal with contractors that violate environmental 
legislation.  
Third, measures directed at legal compliance may be concerned 
with ensuring a level playing field. For example, firms that do not 
comply with their legal obligations by paying taxes or complying with 
labour law and so forth enjoy an unfair competitive advantage and 
may drive legitimate operators out of the market. Measures to 
address this issue have been important in recent public procurement 
reforms in South Africa, for example (Letchmiah, 1999). This is also 
one rationale for EU provisions allowing states to exclude contractors 
who have failed to pay taxes or social security contributions (as 
stated in the Opinion of Advocate General Poiares Maduro in La 
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Cascina: Joined Cases C-226/04-C-228/04, La Cascina v Ministero 
della Difesa [2006] E.C.R. I-1347, para.24 of the Opinion).  
Finally, procurement measures concerned with a contractor’s 
compliance with legal standards can help to ensure that government 
funds are not used to support enterprises that use government 
contracts as a means to raise revenue for terrorist or other criminal 
activities. This has been an objective of exclusion policies adopted by 
New York, for example (Anechiarico & Jacobs, 1995).  
Procedural Issues: Transparency and Fairness 
In most countries a feature of the external norms supported by 
procurement measures is that there are mechanisms for judging 
compliance that are formal and transparent, and follow fair 
procedures. For example, compliance may be judged by criminal 
courts or regulatory agencies. Procurement measures implemented 
for legal non-compliance may rely on these external mechanisms, in 
that the application of procurement measures – such as exclusions – 
is subject to criminal convictions or other formal determinations of 
non-compliance. This is the case, for example, with the mandatory 
exclusion provisions for corruption in the EU procurement directives, 
which apply only where there is a conviction (Williams, 2009).  
Reliance on external adjudication may to some extent meet 
objections over the fairness of procedures and possible abuse of 
discretion that may apply if the procuring entity itself is left to decide 
whether a contractor has violated the law. It may also limit any need 
for the procuring entity, without the necessary expertise or resources, 
to investigate a contractor’s position. However, administrative 
difficulties may still arise, since it may not be easy to obtain evidence 
of convictions, especially when dealing in the increasingly global 
marketplace with firms that may have convictions abroad. Policies 
based on criminal convictions may also be exceedingly difficult to 
apply if they also involve excluding related persons (such as parent 
companies or directors) and there is no formal, external mechanism 
to identify these companies. This can hamper both efficient 
procurement and the effectiveness of the horizontal policies 
themselves (Anechiarico & Jacobs, 1995). To overcome these 
obstacles formal information mechanisms may be needed. Thus in 
Northern Ireland, for example, the Equality Commission has 
responsibility for bringing to procuring entities’ attention violations of 
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FETO that result in exclusions for the violator and related firms (FETO 
Article 62(3)).  
Procurement policies concerned with violation of general norms 
are also sometimes applied without a non-compliance determination 
under the general legislation. For example, the World Bank rules 
applicable to Bank-financed contracts now provide for excluding 
contractors that have engaged in corruption even without a criminal 
conviction (World Bank, 2004, Section 1.15). This raises the question 
of whether it is appropriate to determine non-compliance and impose 
sanctions without the safeguards of a “normal” process such as a 
criminal trial. To a large extent, the issues are the same here as with 
any procurement determination involving consequences for 
contractors – for example, lack of technical qualifications to perform 
the contract – namely, how to balance contractor interests with an 
efficient procurement process. For policies based on non-compliance 
with external norms, however, an additional dimension is that the 
determination of non-compliance may carry a stigma because the 
conduct is also condemned by the ‘external’ normative system (such 
as criminal law). However, this occurs in many other situations, such 
as when civil legal liability (such as a requirement to pay 
compensation) is imposed for conduct that is also criminal, and 
seems unobjectionable merely because of this additional dimension. 
The determination of a violation does not involve the same 
consequences as a conviction (or other regulatory procedure) and 
there is thus no prima facie reason to apply the procedural rules of 
criminal law.  
Implications for International Trade Regimes 
We can note that policies limited to legal compliance are less 
likely to violate international trade regimes on procurement than 
those that go beyond this. For example, under EU law, Member States 
may exclude from major government procurements firms that have 
criminal convictions, but they are not permitted generally to exclude 
firms for non-compliance with government policies not embodied in 
general regulatory legislation (Arrowsmith, 2009). One reason for this 
may be that exclusions based on norms that are externally set and 
applied are less open to abuse than other exclusions – a 
consideration that also makes the former exclusions potentially more 
acceptable under national rules. 
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In general, legal norms applicable to performing the contract that 
are reinforced through procurement measures will be the norms of 
the awarding state itself: most bidders will be national contractors 
subject to national law. However, when contracts are performed by 
foreign contractors and/or contract work (such as the manufacture of 
supplies) is carried out abroad, legal norms laid down by another 
state – the state where the work is carried out -  may apply, and these 
may also be the subject of procurement measures by the state 
awarding the contract. Indeed, as mentioned above, governments 
may find procurement sanctions particularly useful when other 
enforcement methods, such as criminal sanctions, are outside their 
own control. States may also wish to adopt policies that take account 
of compliance with the laws of other countries beyond the contract – 
for example, exclusions for corruption regardless of the country of 
conviction.  
Policies that Go Beyond Compliance with General Legal 
Requirements 
Some Examples and the Relationship with the Second and Third 
Distinctions 
In addition, horizontal policies can provide social or 
environmental benefits that go beyond those arising from contractors’ 
compliance with the general law.  
Again, such policies may be limited to work on the contract itself 
– for example, a requirement for a contractor to engage a certain 
proportion of disabled persons on the contract. However, they may 
also extend beyond it. To promote gender and racial equality a 
government might exclude firms that do not adopt a pro-active policy 
to implement a gender and ethnic balance in their workforce, even 
though such a requirement is not imposed on firms in general. Such a 
policy has been adopted by the United States government, for 
example under a programme that extends also to other areas, such 
as veteran status (McCrudden, 2007, Chapter 6). This approach 
contrasts with the use of procurement to promote political and 
religious equality in Northern Ireland, where procurement sanctions 
support comprehensive legal obligations applicable to all firms in 
Northern Ireland, not just government contractors. 
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Constitutional Issues  
Sometimes policies limited to government contractors are 
established without any legislative basis. Indeed, the fact that 
legislation may not be needed but is required for alternative 
approaches, such as criminal sanctions, or is needed only in a 
particular form – such as secondary rather than primary legislation – 
may be one reason for choosing procurement as a policy tool. The 
decision of the US government to implement equality policies through 
procurement appears to have been taken because of the difficulty of 
putting regulatory legislation through Congress (McCrudden, 2007, p. 
139). Procurement may also be chosen because it is the only tool 
available. Local authorities in the UK in the 1980s used procurement 
to support various policies, such as gender equality (Carr, 1997Date 
disagrees with RL), as more direct regulation was patently beyond 
their legal powers. This has sometimes raised constitutional concerns 
over whether it is appropriate for authorities to do indirectly what they 
may not do directly. In some cases the courts or legislature have 
intervened to clarify or provide that such “indirect regulation” is, 
indeed, forbidden – for example, with UK local authorities’ use of 
procurement to support anti-apartheid policy in the 1980s by 
excluding from government contracts firms that had dealings with 
South Africa (see R v Lewisham L.B.C., ex p. Shell U.K [1988] 1 All ER 
938 and Local Government Act 1988, s.17). To some extent, 
however, this “horizontal” approach to policy making has recently 
been positively endorsed by legislation “mainstreaming” certain 
policies across all government activity. UK legislation now requires all 
public authorities to consider various equality matters in the exercise 
of all their functions, including procurement, even though most 
authorities have no regulatory powers over this subject matter 
(currently under the Race Relations Act 1976, s.71, Sex 
Discrimination Act 1975, s.76A and Disability Discrimination Act 
1995, section 49A; and in future (when this is brought into force) 
under Equality Act 2010, s.149, which covers a whole range of 
characteristics).  
Because horizontal policies often appear as a form of regulation, 
is it justifiable to use procurement in this manner when the effect is 
to “regulate” government contractors but not other firms? Whilst 
private individuals generally have no option but to express their social 
and environmental preferences through purchasing and similar 
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activities – and increasingly do so as one aspect of Corporate Social 
Responsibility (Vogel, 2005, chapter 4) - government does have the 
option of broader regulatory measures.  
Two justifications can be offered for this use of procurement 
power as a means of regulation.  One is ensuring that government is 
associated with the highest possible standards. As with policies 
designed to ensure legal compliance, horizontal procurement 
measures may be adopted both to set an example – which may 
encourage wider acceptance of the standards – and to avoid public 
criticism.  
The second justification concerns effectiveness: procurement is 
in some fields a more effective policy instrument than alternatives, 
such as criminal sanctions and can justify a decision to focus limited 
resources on this approach. As Morris (1990) states (in the context of 
equal opportunities policies): “the individual complaint and 
adjudication model of tackling discrimination is fundamentally flawed 
by problems of legalism, tortuous procedure and satisfying the legal 
burden of proof. Contract compliance, in contrast, is not handicapped 
by these problems. It evades the inherent deficiencies of individual 
adjudication or institutional investigation…” (pp.88-89). Further, the 
government’s close relationship with its contractors can help ensure 
effective monitoring of policies.  
The use of procurement in a way that goes beyond merely 
requiring compliance with the general law may also raise other 
constitutional concerns especially – as Daintith (1979) has 
highlighted – when procurement supports normative standards 
applied to behaviour outside the contract. Such concerns may relate 
to, for example, the democratic legitimacy of regulation through 
procurement, the adequacy of procedural safeguards, legal certainty, 
and transparency.  
As already shown some similar concerns may arise with policies 
limited to legal compliance – for example, over procedural safeguards 
when a procuring entity makes its own determination of whether a 
contractor has violated the law. However, such concerns are more 
frequent with policies that go beyond the general law.  
One reason for this is that – as mentioned above – regulation 
through procurement may not require the primary legislation that 
tends to provide best for the application of constitutional principles to 
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administrative processes. A second, related, factor is that (as already 
mentioned) when procurement is used merely to enforce legal 
requirements, external mechanisms, such as the criminal courts, are 
often used to adjudicate compliance, and these provide for 
safeguards for contractors. A third consideration is that government 
contracting sometimes is not subject to adequate or clear 
constitutional controls – for example, general administrative law 
principles concerning due process and rationality in decision making 
(Bailey, 2007). Such concerns do not, however, cast any doubt on the 
suitability of procurement as a policy tool per se, but merely on the 
way in which constitutional principles are applied in practice to 
“regulation through procurement”. They merely highlight the need to 
take special care to implement such policies in accordance with 
ordinary constitutional values.  
In practice many regimes do take steps to do this and use formal 
instruments – including legislation – to implement horizontal policies 
even when not constitutionally required. These often set out the 
policy in detail to ensure legal certainty, transparency and “due 
process” to safeguard contractors’ interests. As mentioned, one 
approach is to provide for a body external to the procuring entities to 
take decisions, such as whether contractors have violated applicable 
non-legal norms. An example is the United States Office of Federal 
Contract Compliance Programs (part of the US Department of Labor’s 
Employment Standards Administration) which has central 
responsibility for programmes on affirmative action in the workplace, 
including decisions on non-compliance by contractors. Central 
responsibility for making, collating and publicising decisions under 
horizontal programmes can help to promote transparency, 
consistency and effective enforcement; can ensure adequate 
safeguards for contractors, by focusing resources and expertise in 
one place; and can help avoid the delays to procurements that may 
occur when decisions are made ad hoc. This is especially important 
for complex decisions such as how non-compliance by one company 
should affect associated companies.  
Implications for International Trade Regimes 
We can finally note a point that is of increasing importance in the 
era of globalisation, namely that foreign participation creates 
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significant additional complexities for policies that extend beyond 
legal compliance.  
In this respect, governments implementing such social policies 
must decide whether to apply them to foreign firms and/or work done 
abroad. When governments seek to ‘buy’ through government 
procurement social benefits, such as skills training (by providing for 
training of contract workers by contractors) or employment 
opportunities for persons with disabilities, they may not wish to pay 
for these when the benefits will go outside the jurisdiction. It may also 
seem inappropriate, as well as involving unjustified costs, to use 
procurement to “regulate” firms or activities that are generally 
outside domestic jurisdiction – for example, to ensure compliance 
with programmes to create a drug-free workplace. One possibility 
here is for governments to confine their measures to domestic 
contractors/activities. However, in procurements involving foreign 
competition (whether under international free trade regimes or 
otherwise), this may mean both losing an opportunity to use 
procurement as a policy tool (if the work goes to a foreign firms or is 
outsourced off-shore) and placing domestic firms at a competitive 
disadvantage (because of the extra costs of complying with the policy, 
which is a more visible and immediate disadvantage than a 
disadvantage arising out of more general regulatory legislation). 
Another possibility is to exclude foreign firms/activity altogether. 
However, where the contract is regulated under trade rules (such as 
that of the Government Procurement Agreement of the World Trade 
Organisation (GPA) this may require the negotiation of exceptions or 
use of treaty derogations that are of uncertain scope.  
Such issues are becoming more prominent with increasing 
globalisation and the expanding coverage of trade agreements on 
procurement. How to balance the interests of government in using 
procurement to implement horizontal policies with considerations of 
free trade is, in fact, one of the most pressing and debated issues 
raised by trade agreements in procurement (Arrowsmith & Kunzlik, 
2009; Arrowsmith, 2003; McCrudden, 2007). This is particularly in 
the case of policies going beyond legal compliance and going beyond 
the contract (see below), which may have a significant impact on 
trade    
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POLICIES CONFINED TO PERFORMANCE OF THE CONTRACT BEING 
AWARDED AND POLICIES THAT GO BEYOND CONTRACT PERFORMANCE 
Introduction 
The second distinction in this paper’s taxonomy is between 
policies that are concerned only with the work under the contract 
awarded, and policies that extend to a contractor’s other activities. 
This has sometimes been characterised as a distinction between the 
“government as purchaser” and “government as regulator” (e.g., 
Arrowsmith, 2005; McCrudden, 2007). Further, various policy 
concerns arise that often correspond broadly with these two groups of 
measures.  
However, both in describing and assessing horizontal policies and 
in analysing the impact of legal rules, this simple characterisation is 
often too crude and a more detailed taxonomy as elaborated below 
(Arrowsmith & Kunzlik, 2009) is needed. 
Policies Confined to Contract Performance 
Policies relating to the contract may seek merely to ensure 
compliance with the law – for example, that the contractor complies 
with health and safety laws when carrying out the work. However, 
they may also seek benefits from the work that go beyond those 
provided for by law, such as the employment of disabled persons on 
the contract beyond any legal minimum requirements. 
Policies within this group can be sub-divided into several further 
categories that are useful for legal analysis, in particular. The first two 
correspond with the first two mechanisms for implementing 
horizontal policies outlined below, whilst the others are sub-divisions 
that are relevant for all or some of the remaining mechanisms 
(contract conditions, award criteria, exclusions, etc.). They are as 
follows: 
1. Decision to purchase or not to purchase – for example, a 
decision not to proceed with construction works because of the 
impact on the environment  
2. Decision on what to purchase – for example, to purchase 
helicopters rather than life boats for sea rescue (see further 
below).  
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3. Policies implemented through mechanisms in the award 
process. This third group may be divided into four sub-
groups:  
a)  Consumption Measures. This refers to the effect of 
products, works or services when consumed, whether by 
the procuring entity, the public, or others. For example, the 
government may require that the subject matter of the 
procurement can be used by all employees or members of 
the public – for example, that food served in government 
canteens or in schools caters to all religious groups, or that 
IT equipment in offices and libraries is accessible for 
disabled users (Boyle, 2009; Yukins, 2004).  
b) Production/Delivery Measures. A second sub-category 
comprises measures concerned with the impact of 
production or delivery (but excludes contract workforce 
issues, which are treated separately). Production and 
delivery are included in one category since in the case of 
certain works and services production and delivery to the 
customer are merged (although with goods they are 
generally separate processes). This sub-category is 
particularly important for environmental policy. Purchasers 
might specify that products  should be composed of 
recycled materials or should be obtained from sustainable 
sources – for example, electricity from renewable sources 
(Kunzlik, 2009) or timber and timber-products from legal 
and sustainable sources (as is UK government policy: 
Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, 2007, 
p.29). For works or services authorities might try to limit the 
environmental impact of delivery, such as through 
requirements not to waste energy during delivery.  Social 
considerations may be implemented through requirements 
concerning the location of production ( e.g., for goods to be 
locally produced) or manner of production – for example, 
the South African government has used labour-intensive 
methods for construction of works, such as rural gravel 
roads, to provide employment opportunities (Government of 
South Africa, 1997, pp. 61-65).  
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c) Disposal Measures. Third, governments might include 
provisions on the disposal of goods such as requirements 
for contractors to recycle their supplied products after use. 
d) Workforce Measures. Finally, governments may implement 
horizontal policies through measures relating to the 
composition or working conditions of the contract 
workforce. Like other procurement measures, these may be 
limited to ensuring compliance with legal obligations, but 
often go beyond this. In the United Kingdom for the early 
part of the twentieth century, central government inserted 
contract terms requiring “fair” working conditions for those 
employed on government contracts that were more 
favourable than those under the general law (Bercusson, 
1978). Contract clauses might also require contractors to 
provide work on the contract for persons with disabilities.  
Policies may relate to more than one group – for example, an 
environmental award criterion that takes account of a product’s 
whole carbon footprint. However, it is useful to distinguish the four 
sub-groups both for purposes of exposition and because of different 
treatment in legal and policy discourse. For example, there is much 
debate in the context of trade agreements, including within the WTO 
and EU, over whether measures relating to production impacts 
are/should be treated differently from measures relating to 
consumption, especially with production measures included in 
contracts for the supply of goods (e.g. Kunzlik [1998]; and see 
Arrowsmith [2009] more generally on different treatment of these 
sub-categories under EU law). One reason for this is the greater 
impact of production measures on trade: in practice, production 
measures implemented for goods supplied to government may need 
to be implemented in a factory or business as a whole, and may thus 
deter participation. Another reason for concern over production 
measures potential extra-jurisdictional effect, since the regulated 
production may take place abroad. In these respects, production 
measures focused on contract performance may in fact be similar in 
their impacts to policies that go beyond the contract, as is discussed 
in the next section. 
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Policies that Go Beyond Contract Performance 
For descriptive purposes, policies that go beyond contract 
performance can be divided into three main groups. 
First, they include policies that regulate contractors’ behaviour 
across their business activity as a whole. Examples already 
mentioned are policies in the US and Northern Ireland (under FETO) 
that exclude from government contracts firms that do not develop 
affirmative action policies for workforce equality. Other examples are 
measures excluding firms that have business dealings with 
“undesirable” third countries. A notable illustration of this kind of 
measure is the former policy of some US states to exclude 
contractors that had connections with Myanmar (Cleveland, 2001) – 
a policy ultimately declared unconstitutional, however, under US law 
(Linarelli, 2001) and also challenged under the GPA (Arrowsmith 
2003, pp. 327-328). Again, some policies of this kind are limited to 
legal compliance – to ensuring that the contractor complies with the 
law in its activities, as with the Northern Ireland policy under FETO. 
However, others impose standards on contractors’ businesses 
beyond those of undertakings in general – as with the US federal 
equality policy. 
A second group of policies going beyond contract performance 
comprises policies under which the government does not so much 
seek to change behaviour as to support undertakings with particular 
characteristics. Examples are award preferences or set-asides to 
assist small businesses and/or those owned by disadvantaged social 
groups, as in South Africa - where the government has made 
extensive use of public procurement to redress the inequalities that 
were institutionalised under the old regime of apartheid (Bolton, 
2007), and expressly endorses this use of procurement in the 
Constitution - and in the United States (McCrudden, 2007, Chapter 
7). Procurement measures have often also been used to support 
workshops providing employment for the disabled, as under the EU 
procurement directives which allow set-asides for such workshops 
(Boyle, 2009). Of course, there is no clear-cut distinction between the 
first and second group here - for example, policies supporting 
minority-owned businesses may both seek to support these 
businesses and to encourage established firms to take minorities into 
the business.  
166  ARROWSMITH 
 
 
Finally, this category includes “offsets” – policies that involve 
contractors to provide community benefits – for example, by building 
community facilities or factories - that are not necessarily connected 
with the contract.  
Policies directed at, or affecting, behaviour outside government 
contracts often impose a greater burden on contractors than policies 
limited to the contract, especially when they extend to all the 
contractor’s activities. As a result, there are also potentially greater 
costs for the procurement process. These arise both because of the 
costs of compliance reflected in tenders, and because (especially 
with contract conditions laid down by government) these policies may 
reduce the pool of contractors. These policies have also generated 
concerns under trade rules because of their impact on market 
access: to the extent that they go beyond legal compliance, at least, 
they are generally prohibited under the EU procurement directives 
(Arrowsmith, 2009).  
However, this difference between policies formally limited to 
contract performance and those going beyond it is a matter of 
degree, which depends on the nature of the contract. Thus, as we 
have already mentioned above, even policies formally limited to 
contract performance may have a significant impact on wider 
business activity. For example, compliance with a clause requiring 
supplies to be produced without pollution may effectively require a 
business to change its production methods (and has led the 
European Commission to suggest – controversially – that under EU 
law measures relating to production of supplies are not to be 
considered as measures relating to the performance of a contract – 
which are generally permitted – but are forbidden [European 
Commission, 2001, p.18]). Similarly, it may be difficult for a 
contractor to make required changes to working conditions only for 
workers on government contracts, either because individual workers 
are involved in both governmental and non-governmental work, or 
because it is problematic to apply different pay and conditions to 
similar work within the organisation.  
MECHANISMS FOR IMPLEMENTING HORIZONTAL POLICIES 
As mentioned, a third distinction in the taxonomy is one between 
different mechanisms for implementing horizontal policies. Many of 
these mechanisms are appropriate for all types of policies – that is, 
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both for policies that are limited to compliance with the law and those 
that are not, and both for policies that are confined to contract 
performance and those that are not. However, this is not always the 
case: a contractor’s ability to comply with external legal requirements 
may be unsuitable as an award criterion. 
Whatever the mechanism chosen, incorporating horizontal 
policies into procurement generally involves costs that must be 
weighed against any benefits. There has been a significant amount of 
research assessing the impact of different policy mechanisms 
(usefully summarised in McCrudden [2007, pp. 594-617]) but much 
remains to be done.  
First, horizontal policies often involve paying higher prices and/or 
involve some adverse impact on other features of a supplier’s offer, 
such as service quality.  
This is not, of course, invariably the case. Indeed, some horizontal 
policies bring commercial benefits. Thus buying more expensive low-
energy light bulbs may save funds if extra initial expenditure is 
outweighed by lower energy costs, whilst policies to enhance access 
of small suppliers without any preferences (mechanism below) may 
lead to greater competition and hence to better prices.  
However, many policies do involve additional costs. These may 
arise from costs to suppliers of providing the social or environmental 
benefits (for example, the extra costs of features to make buses 
accessible to wheelchairs or of enhanced working conditions). They 
may also arise from the fact that some firms are deterred from 
participating, reducing competition. The position here is, of course, no 
different in principle from that which applies when purchasing 
“commercial” benefits under a contract, such as where the 
government specifies for a high quality of service in a contract. 
However, the costs and benefits of certain horizontal policies, notably 
those that regulate behaviour beyond the contract, may be difficult to 
establish. We outline below how different policy mechanisms may 
affect the government’s ability both to identify and to control the 
extent of costs and benefits. 
A second cost may arise from increased discretion – for example, 
the discretion to exclude firms that do not meet horizontal 
requirements or the extra discretion involved in applying social award 
criteria. This discretion involved is not necessarily greater than that in 
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other assessments – for example, of technical capability – but the 
overall scope of discretion in the procurement may be increased. This 
will be a greater concern for systems that place significant emphasis 
on limiting discretion and its potential for abuse as a means of 
achieving procurement objectives, whether those objectives are value 
for money, reducing corruption and/or preventing discrimination on 
grounds of nationality. This is something that varies between 
individual states and entities according to such factors as the extent 
of corruption and skills of purchasing officers (see Kelman, 1990; 
Arrowsmith, 2002; Schooner, 2001).  
Other costs from horizontal policies are the cost of checking for 
compliance, assessing additional award criteria and so forth, and the 
cost to firms of complying with additional administrative requirements 
(which may also deter participation) (e.g. Wittie [2002], considering 
the US federal system of domestic preferences). The potential for 
horizontal policies to create significant costs if implemented 
effectively is illustrated by the problems encountered in systems for 
excluding contractors involved in corruption: in particular, preventing 
unscrupulous firms from evading exclusion by setting up new 
companies may involve disproportionate costs for the administration 
and for suppliers in general (Anechiarico & Jacobs, 1995). The 
disruption and costs of complaints or legal disputes may also be 
increased by adding horizontal policies into the procurement process. 
Both costs and benefits vary according to the mechanism used, 
as well as according to other factors, such as the consistency and 
effectiveness with which the policy is applied and monitored. The 
main inherent costs and benefits of the different policy mechanisms 
are noted briefly in the following taxonomy of available mechanisms. 
The Decision to Purchase or Not to Purchase  
The very reason for making many purchases in the first place is, 
of course, to implement social policies (to provide health facilities, 
education, etc.) or to provide environmental benefits (for example, 
with the procurement of a recycling plant). In addition, however, a 
decision whether to make a particular purchase at all may be 
influenced by social or environmental concerns that are distinct from 
those achieved through the products, works or services themselves – 
that is, by horizontal concerns.  
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First, a decision to purchase may be made not only because of 
the benefits from those products, works or services directly, but also 
because of the other resulting benefits. For example, states have 
often undertaken public works programmes to provide employment 
and an economic boost in times of high unemployment or recession 
– something being considered by many governments in the current 
economic climate. Here both the desire for buildings or other 
infrastructure to use for offices, transport and the boost to 
employment may influence the decision to go ahead with the project. 
A government might also undertake a programme that uses 
innovative products not merely because of the direct benefit (for 
housing) but to develop the products concerned – for example, 
constructing experimental housing using environmentally friendly 
materials. 
Secondly, a government might decide not to proceed with a 
purchase that it would otherwise make because of social or 
environmental impacts.  For example, it may decide after an enquiry 
to abandon a plan for a dam because of adverse environmental 
impact.  
The Decision on What to Purchase  
Assuming that a decision has been made to undertake a 
particular function or project, the basic means chosen for carrying it 
out may be influenced by social or environmental concerns, as well as 
by the direct requirements of the function itself. For example, a 
procuring entity might for environmental reasons decide to construct 
a video-conferencing facility, rather than to spend money on travel for 
meetings. Similarly, it might decide to purchase helicopters rather 
than lifeboats for sea rescue in order to support a national helicopter 
industry. The decision on how to implement a project – as well as the 
decision to undertake it – might also be influenced by the desire to 
develop new products or services.  
There is no bright line between the concept of a decision whether 
to purchase, as discussed above, and the decision on what to 
purchase; nor between the decision on what to purchase and the 
decision on how to describe that purchase in the contract conditions 
(discussed below). Thus a choice of means may involve a 
compromise on functionality – for example, video-conferencing may 
be inferior to meetings in ensuring effective discussions but chosen 
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for the environmental benefits. Whether a decision to choose a 
particular means, or to scale down a project, should be classified as a 
decision not to make a purchase or a decision on what to purchase is 
a matter of degree. Similarly, whether a particular specified 
requirement is merely a function of a specified product or a different 
means of meeting a need is also a matter of degree. However, it is a 
convenient classification for descriptive purposes.  
Contract Conditions Laid Down by the Purchaser  
Once a decision is made to procure, entities may seek to 
implement social or environmental objectives through contractually 
binding conditions. These conditions may often be concerned solely 
with contract performance. Such conditions, like many of the other 
mechanisms to be discussed next, may be of several types: thus, as 
explained previously, they may relate to consumption effects, 
production or delivery effects, disposal effects, or workforce matters. 
In addition, conditions may be laid down to promote compliance with 
requirements that are not limited to the contract work. For example, a 
government requiring its contractors to implement fair recruitment 
policies across their business might include this as a contract term.  
As well as laying down contract conditions to be performed by all 
successful tenderers, governments also often include contract terms 
as part of other policy mechanisms. For example, they might include 
warranties that the contractor concerned is eligible for a set-aside or 
award preference,  
As with other contract conditions, it is advisable to draft 
“horizontal” contract conditions to maximise their benefits by giving 
suppliers the flexibility over how to meet the government’s functional 
requirements. For example, under a policy requiring firms to utilise 
long-term unemployed persons in government works contracts, it may 
not be appropriate to specify precisely how unemployed persons 
should be engaged (whether as employees, employees of sub-
contractors etc); leaving contractors free to use the most cost-
effective methods, especially since contractors are likely to have 
better knowledge of the market, might be more beneficial. Limiting 
specifications to functional requirements may, in fact, f have benefits 
that extend beyond the contract by encouraging innovation.  
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The approach of laying down contract conditions for all 
contractors is suitable when there are overriding requirements that 
must be met. This will be the case, of course, if the conditions merely 
reflect existing legal requirements, such as minimum wage 
obligations.  
Conditions to be met by all contractors may also be useful in 
other situations in which there is reliable information that additional 
costs of meeting the requirements are within acceptable limits or 
(more rarely) where the government is unwilling to make the 
purchase without these benefits. (In this case, if the price is too high 
the purchase will not be approved). As already mentioned, additional 
costs may arise both because of the extra cost for firms of meeting 
the requirements and because some firms cannot meet the 
requirements at all and thus cannot participate.  
However, before laying down horizontal requirements that go 
beyond the law, it is useful for governments to consider whether an 
alternative approach is preferable. In particular, it is relevant to 
consider the possibility of social or environmental award criteria 
(mechanism viii). Using award criteria can allow a more precise 
assessment of costs, provide a mechanism to limit these costs, and 
facilitate the best overall combination of social/environmental 
benefits on the one hand, and price and other features, on the other.  
One possible approach is to assess the costs of certain social or 
environmental requirements by requiring or allowing variants – that 
is, bids that propose a different approach to those suggested in a 
“standard” specified solution, including because they propose 
additional features or because they omit certain features of the 
standard bid. Allowing or requiring variants instead of or in addition to 
a standard bid can allow governments to assess the additional costs 
of the additional or omitted features, by comparing the costs of the 
variant and standard bids and taking these into account in the 
contract award criteria. For example, a government might include a 
requirement for providing specific employment for the unemployed in 
a standard bid, but also allow variant bids without these social 
benefits. The award criteria will then need to include the social 
benefits provided by each bid, so that if these outweigh any extra 
costs, the entity can then award the contract to a bid that offers the 
social benefit rather than one that does not. 
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On the other hand, it may sometimes be appropriate to require 
compliance with standards going beyond the law regardless of all 
these considerations. This is especially the case if these standards 
have a symbolic importance that might be compromised by an overt 
trade off between horizontal aspects and commercial considerations 
– for example, where the government seeks to promote compliance 
with certain environmental standards by setting an example. Even in 
this case, however, some flexibility might be provided through the 
discretion that exists in enforcing the conditions in practice (e.g. 
Bercusson, 1978). 
In addition, minimum requirements on social or environmental 
features or benefits for all tenderers may sometimes be combined 
with award criteria that give additional credit to those products or 
services with enhanced environmental or social features. For 
example:  
A mandatory specification might require that all IT for a new 
library should be accessible for deaf, blind and/or physically 
disabled users…. Alternatively, it might be required that a 
percentage of PCs must accommodate the needs of specified 
disabled users, but that credit will be given for extending this 
beyond the specified percentage (a mandatory specification 
combined with an award criterion) or merely that accessibility of 
the equipment will be one factor in judging the most 
advantageous tender (an award criterion only). An award criterion 
relating to accessibility might be used where the authority is 
prepared to commit a fixed budget for the IT refurbishment and 
wishes to select the bidder that can offer the best value for 
money or most accessibility (depending on its priorities, 
expressed through weighting the award criteria)… (Boyle, 2009, p. 
326). 
As well as including contract conditions to obtain specific social or 
environmental benefits under the contract (or to limit its adverse 
impact) a different – or, often, additional – motive for such conditions 
is to promote the development and mass production of products with 
desirable social or environmental features. (As noted, governments 
may even make initial decisions on what projects to undertake for 
this reason). For example, a government may decide to purchase IT 
equipment with features that make it accessible to disabled users not 
merely for the benefit of employees and the public who use this 
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equipment but also to encourage the development and manufacture 
of affordable equipment that can be bought by the private sector 
(Boyle, 2009; Yukins, 2004). This is an additional reason for including 
such features as mandatory requirements of the specifications rather 
than merely as award criteria, since this may be necessary to 
guarantee a market.  
There are various means available to secure compliance with 
contract conditions. First, contractual remedies may be available 
(which may, indeed, be the motivation for including the term as part 
of the contract). Often the remedies are simply those available under 
national contract law, which may include a right to terminate the 
contract, an order to compel performance and/or a right to 
compensation for violations (the nature and amount of which may 
depend on national contract law). General contractual remedies may, 
however, be difficult to exercise – for example a damages remedy 
may require specific and quantifiable damage to the government that 
is difficult to prove for breach of social conditions, whilst terminating 
the contract may be inconvenient because of the costs and delay. For 
this reason it may be useful to provide for suitable remedies directly 
in legislation (such as specific financial penalties) as has been done 
in South Africa, for enforcing contract requirements concerned with, 
inter alia, the involvement of disadvantaged groups in contracts: see 
Preferential Procurement Regulations 2001 pertaining to the 
Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act: No 5 of 2000, 
Regulation 15.  
In addition, to secure the benefits of the policy entities it may be 
appropriate to reject tenders that do not accept the conditions. Often 
entities will be obliged to do this under procurement laws that 
prohibit acceptance of any tenders that do not accept mandatory 
conditions.  
An entity may also wish to exclude even tenderers who are willing 
to accept the requirement when the entity considers that the tenderer 
cannot, or will not, actually comply. This may be important because of 
the practical difficulties that may exist in exercising remedies for an 
actual violation. However, the possibility for rejecting contractors in 
advance increases discretion.  
We can note that the EU’s public sector procurement directive 
(Directive 2004/18/EC), which limits discretion in order to deter and 
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monitor discrimination, prohibits a public purchaser from excluding a 
contractor merely because the purchaser believes that the contractor 
is unable or unwilling to comply with workforce conditions in the 
contract, such as requirements to engage unemployed persons. This 
is apparently because of a concern over the increased discretion this 
entails. This position is criticised for elevating the commercial aspects 
of procurement above the social/environmental aspects by providing 
for stronger enforcement for the former than the latter: entities are 
generally permitted to exclude contractors that they believe cannot 
comply with the “commercial” elements of the contract, such as 
quality standards (Arrowsmith, 2009, section 8.1.4; McCrudden, 
2007, chapters 16 and 17). 
Packaging and Timing of Orders  
Governments may also implement horizontal policies through the 
manner in which they place orders on the market, either through the 
way in which they package their requirements together and/or the 
timing of those requirements. This is a strategy often used to promote 
participation of Small and Medium Sized enterprises (SMEs) in public 
procurement (e.g. European Commission, 2008). For example, a large 
requirement may be divided into separate lots awarded at the same 
time or spread out over time to allow tendering for small amounts.  
Such approaches may seek to enhance value for money by 
widening the market to include more firms – smaller as well as larger. 
However, they may also seek specifically to support SME 
development as an industrial policy objective. In the latter case any 
costs are mainly administrative costs, namely the additional costs of 
letting and administering a large number of smaller contracts rather 
than one large contract. (These costs can, if desired, be factored into 
the bid evaluation by considering them as an award criterion). 
However, governments may adopt such approaches even when they 
involve higher prices or other loss of value. For example, entities may 
package work in small amounts with separate award procedures even 
though it is recognised that this may lead to higher prices by deterring 
larger firms from tendering; or they may limit the amount of work that 
may done by a single firm to promote SME participation even though 
this may mean rejecting tenders that offer better prices. 
 
HORIZONTAL POLICIES IN PUBLIC PROCUREMENT: A TAXONOMY 175 
 
 
Set-Asides  
Another mechanism for implementing horizontal policies is to 
limit participation to a particular group. This approach has been used, 
for example, to support workshops for prisoners and disabled 
persons. For example, the 2004 EU directives now expressly permit 
set-asides for workshops providing employment for persons with 
disabilities, by way of exception to a general prohibition on set-asides 
(Boyle 2009). Set-asides are also often used to provide economic 
opportunities for disadvantaged ethnic groups and SMEs. They are an 
important feature of the US government’s policies to promote small 
businesses, in particular those owned by disadvantaged persons 
(Cibinic & Nash, 1998, Chapter 10).  
Set-aside policies may be favoured by government both for their 
high visibility – through specific results in contracts awarded to the 
beneficiaries – and because their guaranteed and immediate 
allocation of contracts may produce rapid economic results. 
Governments can make set-asides more effective through contractual 
terms, such as a warranty that the contactor is eligible for the set 
aside. 
However, set-asides can also involve a number of significant 
costs (International Trade Centre, 2000).  
Thus costs may arise because of reduced competition combined 
with the fact that the targeted groups may not be as competitive as 
those excluded. Governments may be prepared to pay extra costs, or 
may attempt to eliminate them by allowing set-asides only when they 
can be operated on commercial terms. As with polices implemented 
through contract conditions, the procurement process itself will not 
provide precise information on the extra costs incurred. However, 
governments can to some extent retain the benefits of competition by 
holding a competition and then allowing the best bidder from the 
targeted group to provide the amount that has been set aside only if 
that bidder will match the best terms tendered (the “offer-back” 
approach). This approach was once used by the UK government for 
major contracts awarded to support workshops for the disabled (the 
“Priority Suppliers” scheme) although it was eventually abandoned 
because of restrictions imposed by EU law (Boyle, 2009).  
Another problem with set-asides is that the targeted groups may 
have insufficient incentives to become competitive – and if one policy 
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objective is to develop industries or firms that are competitive in the 
wider market, procurement set-asides may then actually be counter-
productive. Set-asides may also be introduced or maintained as a 
result of political pressure when they are not needed, leading to costs 
without concrete benefits.  
In some cases, in particular when promoting a “national 
champion” or placing contracts strategically to maintain competition, 
contracts may be set aside not merely for a limited group but for 
specific firms. Contracts may also be allocated to specific firms 
without competition in other cases: Under the old UK scheme for 
supporting workshops for the disabled, the government allocated low 
value requirements to these workshops without competition when the 
government was satisfied that the supply was on commercial terms 
(Boyle, 2009). 
Exclusion from Contracts for Non-Compliance with Government 
Policies  
Another important mechanism for implementing horizontal 
policies is exclusion from contracts. Exclusion, or the threat of 
exclusion, may be used to encourage compliance with government 
policies and/or to penalise past violations.  
Relating this mechanism to the first distinction in our taxonomy, 
we can note that as with many other procurement mechanisms, such 
as contractual conditions, exclusions may support general norms not 
limited to government contractors, such as those of the criminal law. 
The EU’s mandatory exclusion of firms convicted of certain criminal 
offences and Northern Ireland’s policy of excluding firms that violate 
obligations not to discriminate on grounds of religious or political 
belief - both discussed earlier – are examples of this.  
Exclusions may also be used, however, to support norms laid 
down solely for government contractors. This, as previously noted, is 
the case with the US policy of excluding contractors that do not 
implement recruitment policies promoting workplace equality.  
With regard to the second distinction in the taxonomy, exclusions 
(as again with some other mechanisms) may be limited to supporting 
compliance with norms relating to the contract awarded. Thus 
governments may exclude a firm merely to ensure that a contract is 
awarded only to a supplier that can perform certain contract 
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conditions (whether concerning consumption, delivery or production, 
disposal or the contract workforce) – for example, a condition that 
electricity supplied under the contract is from renewable sources. 
Exclusion may also, however, again be used as a tool to ensure 
compliance with requirements not limited to contract performance, as 
with the EU’s mandatory exclusion provisions (which require exclusion 
for all past convictions) and the US policies promoting workplace 
equality. The government may also wish to use exclusion as a 
sanction for non-compliance with previous government contracts 
such as violation of previous contractual terms on fair working 
conditions. Failure to comply with past requirements may, of course, 
provide evidence of inability to comply in the future, and past non-
compliance might be invoked to exclude for this reason, as well as by 
way of penalty for past violations.  
A government may often wish to use both exclusions and contract 
conditions together. When a works contract includes requirements to 
engage the long-term unemployed on the contract both the threat of 
exclusion from future contracts and the availability of contractual 
remedies for violation may help induce compliance.  
Exclusions may result in higher prices and/or a compromise of 
quality, both because they limit competition and because contractors 
that do compete may pass on compliance costs to the government. 
As with set-asides and contractual conditions, the precise costs may 
be difficult to assess. Further, the discretion involved may create 
scope for abuse: for example, exclusions may be abused to exclude 
firms that offer competition to a favoured supplier.  
Nevertheless, exclusions can be useful. First, they allow 
governments to work closely with a limited group of firms on an on-
going basis to improve practices – for example, on recruitment. 
Secondly, as with contractual conditions, they can be used to support 
existing legal norms, such as prohibitions on corruption, or other 
standards (including standards on human rights) when an explicit 
cost/benefit analysis through award criteria seems inappropriate 
because of the moral dimension. As with contract conditions, 
balancing of costs and benefits may also in practice occur through 
the exercise of discretion over whether or not to exclude. Even 
mandatory exclusions are often made subject to exceptions for public 
interest reasons, as is the case with the EU’s mandatory exclusions 
for certain criminal convictions. Such exceptions could potentially be 
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based on cost considerations (although it is not clear that this is 
permitted under the EU’s mandatory exclusions referred to above 
[see Williams, 2009]).  
Preferences in Inviting Firms to Tender  
In some procedures, entities may invite tenders from only a 
limited number of firms – for example, when the costs of evaluating 
many tenders will outweigh the benefits from greater competition, as 
permitted under the restricted tendering procedure under the Model 
Law on procurement of by the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) (UNCITRAL, 1994, Article 20). 
Horizontal considerations might then be taken into account in 
deciding which firms to invite.  
These considerations are most likely to concern the 
characteristics of suppliers – for example, preferences for inviting 
firms from poor regions or workshops for disabled persons. However, 
they could in theory also relate to firms’ relative performance in 
complying with certain standards, such as fair recruitment standards, 
or be used in favour of firms considered likely to offer better social or 
environmental performance. As with award criteria, however, 
preferences might be considered unsuitable for addressing 
compliance with external norms, or with policies based on moral 
principles (such as use of child labour).  
Using this mechanism need not affect other aspects of the 
procurement, such as price or quality, if it is used only when the 
qualified firms are otherwise equal. However, there may still be 
administrative or other costs. Further, value for money may also be 
affected if some firms are deterred from participating because of the 
reduced chance of being invited to tender.  
Award Criteria  
Another common approach to implementing horizontal policies is 
through award criteria – that is, by considering the relative merits of 
different tenders with regard to their social or environmental benefits 
when deciding which tender to accept.  
Award criteria, like contract conditions, will often be limited to the 
performance of the contract. As with many other mechanisms they 
may concern consumption effects (for example, a preference for 
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wheelchair accessible buses), production or delivery effects such as a 
preference for products produced from recycled materials, disposal 
effects for example, a preference for tenders offering to take back the 
products for recycling) or workforce matters (for example, a 
preference for tenders offering contract work to the long-term 
unemployed). Criteria relating to workforce matters have been used in 
Northern Ireland where the government recently undertook a pilot 
project to examine the costs and benefit of such criteria. Under this 
project tenderers for selected projects were required to present an 
employment plan for hiring for work on the contract persons 
unemployed for more than three months. The quality of the plan was 
taken into account as an award criterion - although only when other 
aspects of tenders were equal (Erridge & Hennigan, 2006). The South 
African government has also used award criteria extensively to 
promote the development of disadvantaged groups (Bolton, 2007).  
Award criteria can also, like many other mechanisms, relate to 
bidders’ conduct beyond the contract, such as the merits of different 
firms’ policies to combat discrimination in their general workforce. 
They can also concern the characteristics of the firm itself, such as 
whether it is owned by a disadvantaged ethnic minority or is located 
in a poor region, or the extent to which the supplier can offer offsets 
outside the contract.  
Again, award criteria are not always suitable to support 
compliance with general legal norms, since it often seems 
inappropriate to weigh a contractor’s compliance with the law overtly 
against cost and other considerations.  
Various types of preferences at the award stage, according to the 
way in which they are implemented can also be distinguished as 
follows: 
i) One approach is a fixed price preference for tenders meeting 
certain minimum criteria. An example might be a 10% price 
preference for products made from recycled materials or for 
firms that can meet set requirements for providing work for the 
long-term unemployed. (As explained earlier, an entity could 
provide for such a programme as standard in bids but also 
allow firms to submit variant bids that do not include such a 
programme; it could then weigh the costs and benefits of each, 
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using award criterion that include both financial aspects and 
social benefits).   
ii) Another approach is to vary the preference according to the 
extent to which a firm offers horizontal benefits – for example, 
providing an ascending degree of preference according to how 
many unemployed persons the tenderer will engage. South 
Africa has followed this approach, providing for varying 
preferences according to the degree to which tenders engage 
certain disadvantaged groups on the contract (Bolton, 2007).  
iii) Finally, as with preferences in inviting firms to tender, horizontal 
benefits could be considered only when tenders are otherwise 
equal after applying other award criteria. This was the approach 
adopted in the Northern Ireland pilot project on unemployment 
referred to above. However, this may have limited impact since 
only rarely will other aspects be equal. (It was apparently 
chosen in Northern Ireland because the government considered 
that EU law allows “workforce” award criteria only when bids are 
otherwise equal, although this is a disputed interpretation of 
the law (Arrowsmith, 2009).  
As already mentioned, award criteria can be combined with other 
approaches, such as setting minimum requirements as contract 
terms.  
Using award criteria rather than other methods, such as 
exclusions or contractual conditions laid down for all participants, can 
provide a mechanism to assess the precise additional cost of 
horizontal policies – which will be reflected in the price and other 
terms of tenders – that may be more reliable than the authority’s own 
estimates (although we have seen that the costs of policies 
implemented through contract conditions can sometimes be 
established through use of variants). It also provides a mechanism to 
contain costs within parameters laid down in advance, through the 
weighting of criteria. For example, a weighting of 10% for social 
criteria sets clear limits on the proportion of the contract value that 
will be devoted to social or environmental benefits. Award criteria also 
allow for varying permutations of social/environmental and 
commercial features, according to which offers the best overall value 
for money, given the weighting placed on each one. (This applies 
where the authority uses the varying preference approach described 
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above). For all these reasons, award criteria may be preferred to 
other mechanisms. 
The impact of award preferences will vary according to the 
competitiveness and structure of particular markets, but some 
general observations can be made on the potential costs 
(International Trade Centre, 2000). 
One problem with award preferences to particular firms, such as 
disadvantaged minorities, is that, like some other mechanisms – 
although not necessarily to the same extent – they may involve 
awards to less efficient firms. Such firms are more likely to survive 
when the government segments the market with a price preference 
margin than when it segments the market with set-asides. In 
imperfect markets, award criteria may encourage firms to charge the 
government a higher price than they charge the private sector. As 
with set asides, there is also a danger that preferences will be applied 
when not necessary, giving rise to costs without corresponding 
benefits; this appears to have happened with set asides for small 
businesses in the United States. (See, for example, the review of the 
use of price preferences in certain US procurement measures in 
Federal Register Vol.63 No.125 at 35713). However, such policies do 
at least provide some incentives for the targeted suppliers to operate 
more efficiently to win contracts. 
As in designing contractual requirements for maximum 
effectiveness, award criteria should focus on outcomes, and not be 
over-prescriptive in stipulating how benefits are to be achieved. In the 
same way as it may be useful not to specify precisely how 
unemployed persons should be used on a contract when their 
utilisation is specified as a contractual requirement (whether as 
employees, employees of sub-contractors, etc.), firms can be left free 
to propose how to use unemployed persons when this is taken into 
account as an award criterion. 
Horizontal benefits offered in individual tenders can be included 
as contractual obligations. Where a firm offers to engage long-term 
unemployed persons above any required minimum, this commitment 
can be included as a contract term, thus making contractual 
remedies available to secure compliance. With award criteria based 
on the character of the contractor – for example, ownership by a 
disadvantaged group – the government may make the policy effective 
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by including a contractual warranty that the contractor meets the 
terms of the preference.  
Measures for Improving Access to Government Contracts  
A final approach comprises measures to facilitate access to 
contracts for certain groups without altering the conditions of 
competition (that is, without providing for favourable treatment in the 
competition) and without adjusting the government’s requirements 
(for example, product features or timing of procurements). 
Governments may provide training on procurement procedures to 
SMEs or those from disadvantaged minority groups to help them 
learn about and access opportunities, but not give preferential 
treatment in tendering. Measures to simplify the procurement system 
and reduce burdens – for example, by allowing contractors to access 
contracts across government by completing a single questionnaire – 
also often aim to facilitate the participation of smaller and 
disadvantaged suppliers.  
There may be costs in administering and financing such 
programmes. However, there is unlikely to be any adverse impact on 
value for money in the procurement itself – indeed, it is often an 
objective to improve value for money through fostering wider 
competition. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This article has presented a taxonomy of horizontal policies in 
public procurement based on three key distinctions which are 
relevant regardless of the subject matter of the policy in question. 
The first is a distinction between policies that are limited to securing 
compliance with legal requirements and those that go beyond this; 
the second is a distinction between, measures applied only to the 
contract awarded are distinguished from those that go beyond this; 
and third nine different mechanisms by which horizontal policies are 
applied in procurement are identified.  
As briefly explained, the different approaches and mechanisms 
used present various issues and challenges in terms of their 
transparency, legitimacy and effectiveness, as well as in terms of 
impact on the interests of government contractors and on 
international trade. The legal and policy questions that arise in this 
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area are challenging ones that are not easily answered. However, an 
understanding of the different variations and nuances of horizontal 
policies can help illuminate the choices to be made and so facilitate 
sound development of law and policy in this field.  
NOTES 
1. This article is based on chapter 3 of Arrowsmith, S. and Kunzlik, 
P. (Eds.) (2009). Social and Environmental Policies in EC 
Procurement: New Directives and New Directions (Cambridge, 
UK: CUP), which provides a slightly more detailed and nuanced 
version of the taxonomy set out here.  
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